ABSTRACT

Sciences of economics, management and law are in constant interaction. A change in one of these disciplines affects others. Competition is one of the good examples of such interaction. The economists before the Industrial Revolution had supported the idea of self-regulating markets; and influenced by such ideas, governments avoided intervening in the markets while company managers developed various strategies aiming to support the self-regulation of the market. This idea triggered the emergence of monopolies during and after the Industrial Revolution. As a result of the destructive practices of monopolies, smaller firms began to disappear, and consequently social welfare was damaged. States, with the support of economists, introduced competition law rules with the purpose of preventing discriminatory practices of monopolies. Upon the enactment of competition laws, companies turned to collaboration strategies in order to reduce risks and increase sharing of knowledge. Collaborations are also regulated by competition laws; and companies are prohibited from abusing their dominant position in the market through different anticompetitive strategies such as price determination and sharing of markets. Liner shipping companies followed the collaboration strategy trend, and used several methods for collaboration including firstly conferences, and then strategic alliances and mergers due to regulatory changes. In order to promote the liner shipping industry, governments gave immunities by excluding them from competition regulations. Recently, economic circumstances have led to discussions about the necessity of the immunities, and several governments have already removed the exemptions while a few introduced some limitations. Considering the history as well as recent developments in this field, this thesis, firstly, discusses the place of collaboration strategies in strategic management science in addition to the liner shipping collaboration strategies. Secondly, this thesis examines the competition regulations and related cases in the United States of America (US) and European Union (EU) in the frame of cartels and abuse of dominant position. Finally, the thesis explores the US and EU regulations governing liner shipping collaborations, and compares leading cases of the US, EU and Turkey with each other to draw a road map for Turkey about how the liner shipping collaborations shall be regulated to promote the Turkish national liner shipping fleet.

-ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III

-ABSTRACT VII

-CONTENTS IX

-ABBREVIATIONS XIII

-LIST OF TABLES XV

-INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE – COMPETITION AND COLLABORATIONS IN THE LINER SHIPPING 4

1.1. COMPETITION TYPOLOGIES IN ECONOMICS 5

1.1.1. The Classical Theory of Competition 5

1.1.1.1. Invisible Hand 6

1.1.1.2. Comparative Advantage 7

1.1.1.3. The Capitalist Competition 8

1.1.2. Neo-Classical Theory of Competition 9

1.1.2.1. Selfishness and Competition 9

1.1.2.2. The Failure of Laissez Faire 11

1.2. COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION TYPOLOGIES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 12

1.2.1. Competition Typologies in Strategic Management Discipline 12

1.2.1.1. Strategic Planning Period 14

1.2.1.2. Positioning School 18

1.2.1.3. Resource Based View 24

1.2.2. Collaboration Strategy Typologies in Strategic Management Discipline 25

1.2.2.1. Strategic Alliances 27

1.2.2.2. Merger & Acquisition 29

1.2.2.3. Joint Ventures 30

1.3. COMPETITION AND COLLABORATIONS IN THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSRTY 32

1.3.1. General Characteristics of Shipping Industry 32

1.3.2. Liner Shipping Industry Structure 35

1.3.2.1. Cargoes in Liner Shipping 36

1.3.2.2. Liner Ships and Main Routes 37

1.3.3. Collaboration Strategies of Liner Shipping 41

1.3.3.1. Conference System 41

1.3.3.2. Strategic Alliances 43

1.3.3.3. Mergers and Acquisitions 52

1.3.3.4. Joint Ventures 56

CHAPTER TWO – COMPETITION REGULATIONS GOVERNINS COLLABORATIONS 58

2.1. CARTEL REGULATIONS 59

2.1.1. United States Legislation 63

2.1.1.1. Sherman Act, 1890 64

2.1.1.2. Clayton Act, 1914 71

2.1.1.3. Robinson-Patman Act, 1936 72

2.1.2. European Union Legislation 74

2.2. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 89

2.2.1. The United States Legislation  89

2.2.1.1. Relevant Market 90

2.2.1.2. Conduct-Abuse 93

2.2.2. European Union Legislation 96

2.2.2.1. Relevant Market 97

2.2.2.2. Abuse-Conduct 104

2.3. HORIZONTAL MERGERS 112

2.3.1. The United States Legislation 113

2.3.2. European Union Legislation 122

2.4. HORIZONTAL COLLABORATION GUIDELINES 135

CHAPTER THREE – THE PLACE OF LINER SHIPPING COLLABORATIONS IN THE COMPETITION REGULATIONS 138

3.1. THE UNITED STATES REGULATIONS 140

3.1.1. The Shipping Act Of 1916 142

3.1.2. The Shipping Act Of 1984 146

3.1.3. Ocean Shipping Reform Act 1998 150

3.2. EUROPEAN UNION REGULATIONS 154

3.2.1. Regulation 954/79 156

3.2.2. Regulation 4056/86 158

3.2.3. Regulation 1419/2006 162

3.2.4. 2008 Maritime Guidelines 163

3.2.5. Regulation 906/2009 165

3.3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US AND EU REGULATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PRIMARY JUDGMENTS OF LINER SHIPPING AND A GUIDE FOR TURKEY 167

3.3.1. Primary Judgments 168

3.3.1.1. The Hamburg Line Case 168

3.3.1.2. The Isbrandtsen Case 169

3.3.1.3. Trans-Atlantic Conference Case 172

3.3.1.4. The Cewal Case 174

3.3.1.5. The Çanakkale Strait Cases 176

3.3.2. A Guide For Turkey 179

-CONCLUSION 187

-REFERENCES 197